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RECENT CASES
AccoRD AND SATISFACTIoN-AccEPTANCE OF CONDITIONAL PAYMJENTS.-
BARHAM V. KIZZIA, 140 S. W., 6 (ARK.).-Held, that where a debtor
sends a check to his creditor by mail to apply on a disputed claim, bearing
on its face a statement that it is a "payment in full for all demands," the
indorsement and collection of the check by the creditor renders it an accord
And satisfaction, though the creditor immediately writes to the debtor
stating that the check is accepted only in part payment and demanding
the balance.
The authorities abundantly establish the rule that where a creditor
having a disputed claim against his debtor accepts a smaller sum than the
amount claimed, he cannot afterward maintain an action for the unpaid
balance. Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N. Y., 231. And the same holds where
the creditor collects a check sent him by debtor which recites that the
check is "in full for all demands," Baird v. United States, 96 U. S., 430;
Ostrander v. Scott, 161 Ill., 339; Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N. Y., 326;
even though the creditor refuses to sign a receipt in full. McGregor v.
Construction Co., 188 Mo., 623. A protest on the part of the creditor
gives no better ground for further claim. Snow v. Griesheimer, 220 Ill.,
106. In Robinson v. Detroit, etc., R. R. Co., 84 Mich., 658, it was held a
question of fact for the jury. The case of Canadian Fish Co. v. McShane,
80 Neb., 551, is contrary to the majority holding. In Day v. McLea, 58
L. J. Q. B., 293, the court held that the mere keeping of a check sent "in
full for all demands," is not conclusive evidence of an accord and satisfac-
tion.
CARRIERs-ACTION FOR Loss OF GOODS-LI-MITATIONS APPLICABLE.-
WILLIAmSON & Co. v. RAILWAY Co., 138 S. W., 807 (TEx.).-This was an
action to recover the value of goods destroyed in transit by fire. Held,
that an action against a carrier for non-delivery of goods without sufficient
excuse is one for conversion, so that the statute of limitations for two
years applies, notwithstanding the petition alleges a breach of contract.
The rule stated in the leading case seems to be well settled in Texas.
Railway Co. v. Clemons, 19 Tex. Civ. App., 452. But several courts hold
that the failure of a common carrier to deliver goods lost by it is not a
conversion. Golbowitz v. Express Co., 91 N. Y. Supp., 318; Moses v.
Norris, 4 N. H., 304. This is certainly true if the goods were lost by the
omission of the carrier, though the contrary is held where the goods were
lost by the carrier's act. Hawkins v. Hoffman, 41 A. D., 767 (N. Y.).
And many courts hold that, in an action against a common carrier for loss
or non-delivery of goods, the plaintiff may bring an action on the case for
the breach of duty, or an action for the breach of contract, at his election.
Mershon v. Hobensack, 22 N. 3. Law, 372; Trust Co. v. Railway Co., 70.
Fed., 764; Catlin v. Adirondack Co., 11 Abb. N. C., 377 (N. Y.); Smith v.
Seward, 3 Pa. St., 342. Several cases hold that an action against a car-
rier for failure to deliver goods is a contract action, and that the statute
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of limitations as to torts does not apply to it. Railway Co. v. Rosenburg,
129 Ala., 287; Railway Co. v. Neal, 79 Tenn., 270. This was the decision
where the goods were destroyed by fire. Railway Co. v. Spann, 40 So., 83
(Ala.). And where the allegations of the complaint support a contract
or a tort action, if the action would be barred as a tort action, it will be
treated as a contract action. Railway Co. v. Sweet, 63 Ark., 563.
DIVOaC--ALMONY-DESERTION.-SYDAM v. SUYDAM, 80 Am., 1057
(N. J. CH.)-Held, if a husband be guilty of conduct amounting to a matri-
monial offence that would constitute ground for a divorce or alimony his.
wife is justified in leaving him and the desertion thereby becomes his.
Judicial authorities, although not in entire accord with the position
taken by the main case, support it by weight of numbers. Cattison v. Cat-
tison, 10 Harris 275 (Pa.); Pierce v. Pierce, 33 Ia., 238; Hall v. Hall, 25
Ky. L. &, 1304; Johnson v. Johnson, 125 Ill., 510. Better reason, however,
and some judicial opinions uphold the more liberal view that ill conduct
which will justify a desertion need not be such as would have authorized
a judicial separation or divorce. Lyster v. Lyster, 111 Mass., 327; Naulet
v. Dubois, 6 La. An., 403; Gillinwaters v. Gillinwaters, 23 Mo., 60. But,
in Massachusetts, although the wife is justified in leaving the marital home,
as stated above, the desertion does not become that of the husband. Pidge
v. Pidge, 44 Mass., 257. And in Indiana the conservative view is adopted
that the conduct causing the spouse to leave, in order to constitute a con-
structive ilesertion, must have been such as would itself have been a
ground for an absolute divorce. Barnett v. Barnett, 27 Ind. App., 466. If
the desertion is justified by the husband's misconduct, the fact that he sup-
ports his wife during the separation is not a bar to a divorce for desertion.
Magrath v. Magrath, 103 Mass., 577. But leaving the marital home in
consequence of mere warnings to leave, quarrels, or family unpleasantness
is not, however, held a sufficient ground to constitute desertion on the part
of the spouse who remains. Rathbun v. Rathbun, 76 Mich., 462; Gains V.
Gains, 19 S. W., 929. But forcing the other party to leave by cruelty
and abuse, held, to show desertion. Harding v. Harding, 22 Md., 337. Or
by adultery at the marital home. Marker v. Marker, 11 N. J. Eq., 256.
Although, if husband's adultery, because of which his wife leaves him, was
at a place other than his home, it is held not to constitute desertion by him.
Lake v. Lake, 65 N. J. Eq., 544.
DwVoRcE-DESERTION--4EVIVAL AFTER CONDONATION.-LAFLAMME 
v.
LAFLAmME, 96 N. E., 62 (MASS.)-Held, that where the husband visited
his wife where she was living after having deserted him, and remained for
four days, when they cohabited as man and wife, there was a complete
renewal of the marriage relation, and her subsequent refusal to accom-
pany him to his home would not avoid the effect of his condonation.
In an action for divorce the period of time required by the statute must
be continuous and not interrupted by any conduct constituting condona-
tion. Woolfolk v. Woolfolk, 96 Ky., 657; Dreisler v. Dreisler, 69 N. Y.
Supp., 326; Holmes v. Holmes, 44 Mich., 555. Where there is such inter-
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ruption, a subsequent desertion does not revive the offence, so as to add
the period before to that after. Hitchcock v. Hitchcock, 15 App., D. C., 81;
Ex Parte-Aldridge, 1 Sw. & Tr., 88. In general, cohabitation will constitute
condonation, as in the principal case. Reed v. Reed, 62 Ark., 611; Phelan
v. Phelan, 135 Ill., 445; Rogers v. Rogers, 67 N. J. Eq., 534. But Kennedy
v. Kennedy, 87 Ill., 250, where there was cohabitation for one night and
two days, and Danforth v. Danforth, 88 le., 120, where the husband
visited his wife and for two or three nights occupied the same bed, hold
there was no condonation. These cases seem to hold that in desertion,
unlike adultery, .(see Delliber v. Delliber, 9 Conn., 233, and Anonymous, 6
Mass., 147), but as in cruelty, the mere fact of sexual intercourse alone
will not constitute condonation. See Gardner v. Gardner, 2 Gray, 434, and
Cox v. Cox, 5 N. Y. Supp., 367. However, condonation is less readily
inferred against the wife than against the husband. Miles v. Miles, 101
Ill. App., 406; Home v. Home, 72 N. C., 530; Wright v. Wright, 6 Tex.,
3. But it is well settled that acts implying neither cohabitation nor inter-
course, such as visits to the children or living separately in the same
house, will not condone the desertion. Rie v. Rie, 34 Ark., 37; Stein V.
Stein, 5 Colo., 55; Anslutz v. Anshutg, 16 N. J. Eq., 162.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-AcTIoNs FOR SEPARATE MAINTENANcE-ALLoW-
ANCE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.-KIDDLE V. KIDDLE, 133 N. W., 181 (NEB.).-
Held, that it is the settled rule in this court that in a suit by a wife for
separate maintenance, or for alimony alone, the court may at any time
during the pendency of the suit make an allowance to the wife of a reason-
able sum as suit money, including attorney's fees, to be paid by the hus-
band as the court may direct.
In England and in most of the United States, the allowance of suit
money and counsel fees to the wife in actions for separate maintenance
is treated as a common-law right, where not granted by statute. Fitzger-
ald v. Fitzgerald, 5 Eng. Ecc., 472; Larkin v. Larkin, 71 Cal., 330; McGee
v. McGee, 10 Ga., 477; Wagner v. Wagner, 36 Minn., 239. Contra, Kelley
v. Kelley, 161 Mass., 111; Sanford v. Sanford, 2 iR. I., 64, and Therkelsen
v. Therkelsen, 35 Or., 75, holds that under statute allowance is not per-
mitted. And the weight of American authority holds, contrary to the
English rule, that the attorney can not recover from the husband. 2 Bish.
on M. & D., Sec. 388; Shelton v. Pendleton, 18 Conn., 417; Ray v. Alden,
50 N. H., 82; Wing v. Hnrlburt, 15 Vt., 607. Contra, Glenn v. Hill, 50 Ga.,
94; Ottaway v. Hamilton, 3 C. P. D., 393. The allowance is generally
granted as a matter of course, a prima facie case being a prerequisite.
Litowich, v. Litowich, 19 Kan., 451; Dougherty v. Dougherty, 8 N. 3. Eq.,
540; Bardin v. Bardin, 4 S. D., 305. But it may be denied where the wife
has means, or the husband is destitute. Brady v. Brady, 144 Ala., 414;
Keneiner v. Kenemer, 26 Ind., 330; Coad v. Coad, 40 Wis., 392. Contra,
Lumpkin v. Lumpkin, 78 Ill., 324; Mangels v. Mangels, 6 Mo., App., 481;
and Rawson v. Rawson, 37 Ill. App., 491, holds that the wife's adultery will
bar her right, but the better rule is that after showing probable cause the
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merits of the case will not enter. Cupples v. Cupples, 31 Colo., 443; Frith
v., Frith, 18 Ga., 273; Porter v. Porter, 41 Miss., 116. Such allowances are
made at the discretion of the court, and may be for any time from com-
mencement to dismissal of the suit, including appeals, but not after termi-
nation adversely to the wife. Ex Parte Winter, 70 Cal., 291; Holleman v.
Holleman, 69 Ga., 676; Newman v. Newman, 67 Ill., 167. So also he is
liable, in the absence of condonation, if the suit is dismissed. Weaver v.
Weaver, 33 Ga., 172; Waters v. Waters, 49 Mo., 385; Chase v. Chase, 29
Hun., (N. Y.) 527.
LIMITATION OF AcTIONS-ESTOPPEL-AGREEMENT TO WAIVE.-SITH
v. DUPREE, 140 S. W., 367 (TEx.).-Held, that where, prior to the expira-
tion of limitations, the plaintiff requested payment, and defendant, on
special occasions importuned plaintiff not to sue, agreeing that he would
not plead limitations against the debt, on which request and promise plain-
tiff relied and forbore to sue, defendant was estopped, on being sued after
limitations had run, to plead the statute.
The rule stated in the leading case has been often approved. Bridges v.
Stevens, 132 Mo., 524; Bancroft v. Roberts, 91 N. C., 363; Holman v.
Bridge Co., 117 Ia,, 268. But mere indulgence by the creditor at the
request of the debtor does not estbp him from pleading the statute. Hill v.
Hilliard, 103 N. C., 34. Some cases hold an agreement not to plead the
statute is void as against public policy. Nunn v. Edmiston, 9 Tex. Civ.
App., '562; Wright v. Gardner, 98 Ky., 454. At least this is true if the
waiver is for all time. Crane v. French, 38 Miss., 503. In some states the
agreement operates as an acknowledgement of the debt, and must be in
writing. Hodgdon v. Chase, 29 Me., 47; State Loan Co. v. Cochran, 130
Cal., 245; Shapley v, Abbott, 42 N. Y., 443. It has also been held that the
agreement must be made before the statute has run. Trask v. Weeks, 81
Me., 325. And there must be a valid consideration for the promise. State
Loan Co. v. Cochran, 130 Cal., 245. In Holman v. Bridge Co., 117 Ia., 268,
it is held that such an agreement may operate by way of estoppel to plead
the statute, though it does not amount to a valid contract. But in Shapley
v. Abbott, 42 N. Y., 443, the contrary is held on the ground that, since the
representation is not one of fact, the maker can not be estopped by it.
MANDAMUS-COMPELLING CONSTRUCTION OF RAILROD-PETITIONER.-
PEOPLE V. UNITED TRACTION Co., 130 N. Y. SuPP., 477.-Held, a private per-
son, not interested otherwise than as one of the public, cannot have man-
damus to compel a street railroad company to build its franchise, the griev-
ance which he would attempt to redress being a public and not a private
injury, for which only the state may sue. Betts, J., dissenting.
The authorities are not in harmony as to the right of an individual
,to enforce a public right or to compel the performance of a public duty
by mandamus. In some states a private individual, having, no interest
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-except as, one of the community, is not entitled to the writ. Mitchell v.
Boardman, 79 Me., 469; State v. Charleston Light &.Water Co., 68 S. C.,
540. Yet, other courts hold, that if the act affects the .people at large or
any class of people, any member may move for a mandamus to enforce
a public duty. Union R. R. Co. v. Hall, 91 U. S., 354; Loader %r. Brooklyn
Heights R. Co., 35 N. Y. Supp., 996; Florida Cent., etc., R. Co., v. State,
31 Fla., 482. Of course, if a private person has a peculiar and a special
interest in enforcement of right, he can maintain the action. Southern
Express Co. v. R. M. Rose Co., 124 Ga., 581; Robbins v. Bangor, etc., R.
Co., 100 Me., 496. But, if the right or duty affects the State in its sover-
eign capacity as distinguished from the people at large, the proceedings
must be instituted by the proper public officer. People ex rel Sherwood v.
Bd. Canvassers, 129 N. Y., 360. The fact that a public officer is entitled
to institute proceedings does not defeat the right of a specially interested
individual. State v. Bloom, 19 Neb., 562. Or, even without such interest,
if the public officer is absent or declines to move, the individual may do so.
People v. State University, 4 Mich., 98. But, in all cases mandamus will
be denied where there is other adequate remedy. State v. Kinkaid, 23 Neb.,
641.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE-EvIDENcE.-GALE V. HELmBACHER FORGE & ROLLING MILLS CO., 140
S. W., 77 (Mo.)-Held, evidence that a servant, injured through use of an
improper apparatus, worked with it, knowing it to be unsafe, is evidence of
his contributory negligence.
Where a servant continued work with knowledge, actual or constructive,
of dangers which an ordinary prudent man would refuse to subject himself
to, he is guilty of contributory negligence. Watts v. Boston Tow Boat Co.,
161 Mass., 378; Schulz v. Rohe, 149 N. Y., 132. There is a distinction
between knowledge of defects and knowledge of the risks resulting from
such defects, and a servant is not chargeable with contributory negligence
if he merely knows that defects exist, but does not know, or cannot know
by exercise of ordinary care, that there is danger. Hartrich v. Hawes, 202
Ill., 334; Murphy v. City Coal Co., 172 Mass., 324. However, it has fre-
quently been held that a servant after learning of the risks, is entitled to.
time and opportunity for making complaint; Fordyce v. Edwards, 60 Ark.,
438, that he may continue in the employment a reasonable time for the
remedy of defects and the removal of danger; McCabe v. Montana Cent.
Ry. Co., 30 Mont., 323, and that his failure to complain or quit work does
not charge him with assumption of risk or contributory negligence where
his services are hired for a limited time and he has no right to terminate
'his contract at will. Poirier v. Carroll, 35 La. Ann., 699. Where a defect
or danger is caused by the master's negligence, and is known or ought to
be known, by him, he cannot rely upon the servant's :failure to make com-
plaint or quit work after learning thereof. Seaboard Mfg. Co. v. Woodson,
-98 Ala., 378.
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SALEs-CoNDITIONAL SALES-DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY-POSSESSION
OF SELLER-RECOVERY OF PRICE.-HOLLENBERG MUSIC Co. v. BARRON, 140 S.
W., 582 (ARK.) .- Held, that where a contract for the sale of a, piano
reserved title in the seller, and on default the seller took possession to hold
the piano until payment was made, the destruction of the piano by fire,
without the seller's fault, while in his possession, did not deprive him of
his right to recover the balance of the price.
The court in this case confessed its inability to cite a case where the
precise question involved had been previously decided. Williston on Sales,
pp. 306, 562, favors the application of principles established in analagous
cases. In La Valley v. Ravenna, 78 Vt., 152, the recovery of the purchase
price of property, sold and delivered on condition that the title should not
pass until full payment was made, was allowed, although without the fault
of the purchaser the property was destroyed before the price fell due.
Where the property was delivered, and yet the title and right of possession
were to remain in the vendor as security, its loss leaves the vendee still
liable. Osborn v. South Shore Lumber Co., 91 Wis., 526. Where the seller
retained possession of the goods at the buyer's request, their loss without
negligence on the part of the seller falls upon the buyer. Whitlock v.
Auburn Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 120. If the vendee refuses to take the
goods, the vendor may store them as bailee, give notice of the fact, and
then sue for the contract price. Hobeler v. Rogers, 131 Fed., 43. The same
principle is illustrated where the seller repossesses himself of property
fraudulently obtained and thereby preserves his lien for the price without
recission. Ames v. Moir, 130 IIl., 582.
TRESPASS-DAMAGES-CUTTING AND REmOVAL OF TIMBER.-BAILEY V.
HAYDEN, ET AL., 117 PAC., 720 (WAsir.).-Held, that where a trespasser cuts
and removes standing timber, the owner, if the removal be unintentional,
can recover only the value of the timber when standing, but, if the removal
be intentional, the owner may recover as damages the value of the timber
enhanced by the labor of the trespasser.
When the trespass has been committed unintentionally, the majority
of the cases hold the measure of damages to be, not the value of the trees
as such, but the damage done to the land by their destruction, or the dif-
ference between the value of the land before and after their removal.
Thompson v. Moiles, 46 Mich., 42. There is authority, however, for hold-
ing the value of the trees considered separate and distinct from the land
as the proper measure of damages. Smith v. Gonder, 22 Ga., 353. The
value of timber is to be ascertained by the price paid in the vicinity, and
not at a distant market, Coxe v. England, 65 Pa. St., 212, and at the time
when cut, and not by striking an average of value taken through several
years. Schlater v. Gray, 28 La. Ann., 340. The measure of damages for
the wilful or intentional cutting of timber on another's land is the
enhanced value of the property when finaly converted to the trespasser's
use. U. S. v. Homestake Min. Co., 117 Fed., 481. When the cutting is
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impelled by malice or gross negligence, or attended with circumstances of
aggravation, exemplary damages are usually recoverable under statute, in
most cases treble damages are allowed. Simpson v. Woodward, 5 Kan.,
571; Gates v. Comstock, 113 Mich., 127. Wisconsin has an exceptional
statutory rule, namely, that the damages for timber or trees wrongfully
cut on the land of another are the highest market value thereof in what-
ever state the timber may be put by the party cutting at the time of the
action. Webster v. Moe, 35 Wis., 75.
WITNESSES-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.-
IN RE TRAINER, 130 N. Y. Supp., 682.-Held, that a client's communication
of an address to an attorney, while consulting him in a professional capac-
ity, for the purpose of enabling the attorney to communicate with him, is
a "privileged communication," which the attorney cannot be compelled to
disclose when the relation of attorney and client has ceased, and the infor-
mation is sought in litigation to which the client is not a party.
In general, every communication which the client makes to an
-attorney in a professional capacity is confidential, and the attorney can-
not be permitted, nor the client compelled, to disclose it. Werdell v.
Gray's Harbor, etc., Co., 115 Cal., 517; Struckmeyer v. Lamb, 75 Minn,
366; Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U. S., 311. But as this rule has a tendency to
prevent full disclosure of the truth, it is generally strictly construed.
Turner's Appeal, 72 Conn., 305; Goltra v. Wolcott, 14 I1., 88; Foster v.
Hall, 12 Pick. (Mass.), 89. But Wade v. Ridley, 87 Me., 368, holds contra,
that it should be liberally construed. And there are exceptions to the
general rule, as when attorney and client are engaged in a wrongful act,
or the attorney is a witness to his client's will. Butler v. Fayerweather, 91
Fed., 458; Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N. J. Eq., 455; Dudley v. Beck, 3
Wis., 274. So an attorney may testify as to the identity or as to the hand-
writing of his client. White v. State, 86 Ala., 69; Com. v. Bacon, 135 Mass.,
521; Gower v. Emery, 18 Me., 79; Thomson v. Perkins, 57 N. Y. Supp.,
810. Contra, Parkins v. Hawkshaw, 2 Stark., 239. And it has been held
that an attorney must disclose his client's address. Panisbotham v. Senior,
L. R., 8 Eq., 575; Alden v. Goddard, 73 Me., 345. Contra, Harris v. Holler,
7 Dowl. & L., 319; Heath v. Crealock, L. R., 15 Eq., 257. The better rule
seems to be that an attorney is not protected from making such disclosures
because the address became known to him in his professional,character,
unless communicated to him by the client in professional confidence for
the purpose of obtaining advice. Ex Parte Campbell, L. R., 5 Ch., 703;
Re Arnot, 60 L. T. N. S., 109; Havana City Ry. Co. v. Ceballos, 56 N. Y.
Supp., 360. But in all these cases where disclosure has been allowed, it has
been during the pendency of the action to which the client was a party.
See Carnes v. Platt, 36 N. Y. Super. Ct., 361; Hooper v. Harcourt, 1 H.
Bla, ., 534.
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